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The installation of capacities in excess of the production requirements had attracted 
considerable attention. In a seminal work, Spence (1977) demonstrated that incumbent 
firms deter entry by installing excess capacity. However, later Dixit (1980) 
demonstrated that the result of Spence (1977) was not based on a sound equilibrium 
concept. In an incumbent-entrant framework, Dixit (1980) argued that excess capacity 
could not occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. This finding by Dixit (1980) has 
encouraged large amount of theoretical and empirical research. 
  In a paper, Bulow et al. (1985) have questioned the assumption of Dixit (1980) 
about the behavior of each firm’s marginal revenue to the competitor’s output. They 
have shown that Dixit’s conclusion holds if each firm’s marginal revenue is always 
decreasing in the other firm’s output. But, different assumption may lead to the excess 
capacity in a perfect equilibrium. Basu and Singh (1990) have found that if the post-
entry game is Stackelberg instead of Cournot, as considered in Dixit (1980), excess 
capacity might be the outcome in a perfect equilibrium.  
However, though the empirical works by Masson and Shaanan (1986) and 
Lieberman (1987) confirm the existence of excess capacity, these studies suggest very 
little evidence for deliberately holding excess capacity to deter entry. Lieberman 
(1987) has argued that firms held excess capacity in his sample to accommodate 
demand variability and investment lumpiness. Hence, these studies do not provide 
much support for holding excess capacity as a strategy for entry deterrence. Recently, 
in a theoretical paper, Poddar (1998) has shown that excess capacity can be the 
equilibrium outcome if the market demand is uncertain.
1  
                                                       
1 Ungern-Sternberg (1988) shows the rationale for holding excess capacity in a framework of 
downstream and upstream firms. One may refer to Benoit and Krishna (1987) and Marchionatti and 
Usai (1997) for the implications of excess capacity in the context of international economics.    2
  The present paper argues that holding excess capacity can be a profitable 
strategy if it helps the firms to take advantage from other business strategy such as 
technology licensing. Hence, this paper can justify the co-existence of excess capacity 
and licensing agreements in many industries. Thus, this paper provides a rationale for 
holding excess capacity without the motive for entry deterrence and also in an 
environment without demand uncertainties. 
More specifically, we consider a model with an incumbent firm and a potential 
entrant. While the incumbent firm can produce with a newly invented technology, the 
potential entrant can produce with an old technology whose patent has expired. 
Production requires investment in capacity and we consider that the incumbent firm 
can install capacity prior to entry. If entry occurs then these firms produce like 
Cournot duopolists. However, if entry occurs, the incumbent firm may be willing to 
license his superior technology to the technologically inferior entrant and in that case 
both firms produce their products with the superior technology of the incumbent firm. 
We show that his possibility of licensing can encourage the incumbent firm to invest 
large amount in capacities, some portions of which will be unutilized later. This large 
investment in capacity reduces the reservation payoff of the entrant and helps the 
incumbent firm to extract higher price for his technology licensed to the entrant. This 
benefit from licensing can  outweigh the cost of excess capacity and provides the 
rationale for holding excess capacity in equilibrium. 
We show that the co-existence of excess capacity and licensing can occur 
when the marginal costs are sufficiently small. If the marginal costs are sufficiently 
large then it reduces the benefit from licensing ex-post capacity installation. Further, 
in case of sufficiently large marginal cost of production, the cost from holding excess 
capacity makes this strategy less profitable. Hence, for sufficiently large marginal 
costs of production, excess capacity is less likely to observe. Therefore, this analysis 
shows that excess capacity and licensing is likely to be seen in those industries and/or 
countries where marginal costs of production are sufficiently small. 
The present paper can be related to the literature on technology licensing also. 
The previous works on technology licensing are mainly concerned with the issues 
such as the feasibility of technology licensing, the quality of the transferred 
technology, the optimal patent licensing contract and the concentration effects of 
technology licensing. As a representative sample, one may look at Rockett (1990),   3
Gallini and Wright (1990), Marjit (1990), Kabiraj and Marjit (1992, 1993), Singh 
(1992), Kabiraj (1994), Mukherjee (2001). However, unlike these papers except 
Mukherjee (2001), the present paper considers the effect of licensing on other possible 
strategic moves of the licenser such as capacity installation.  
  In a recent paper Mukherjee (2001) has considered the implications of 
different types of commitment strategies on technology licensing. However, unlike 
Mukherjee (2001), the present paper considers that the incumbent firm does not have 
the incumbency advantage after technology licensing. Mukherjee (2001) is applicable 
to those situations where the firms need time-to-build the capacity. For example, the 
firms may need some general investments before capacity building. In contrary, the 
present paper looks at the situation where the incumbency advantage mainly comes 
from the earlier acquisition of the technology. Therefore, to take the incumbency 
advantage, here the incumbent firm needs to decide on capacity installation before the 
entry of the potential entrant and hence, before the decision on technology licensing.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides the basic 
argument of this paper with a geometric representation. Then, in section 2.2, we prove 
the main result of this paper. Section 3 concludes.   
 
2 Model 
2.1 Geometric representation 
 
Assume that production requires investment in capacity and there is an incumbent 
firm, firm 1. Firm 1 can produce its product with a technology corresponding to the 
constant marginal cost of production  0 1 > c . Consider that there is a potential entrant, 
firm 2, who can enter in the market and can produce the product with a technology 
corresponding to the constant marginal cost of production  1 2 c c > . We can think that 
the incumbent has the patent for his technology corresponding to the marginal cost of 
production  1 c  while the patent of his previous technology has expired. This creates 
the potential threat of entry.
2 Further, assume that there are no other costs of 
                                                       
2 One may think that these technologies require different types of inputs and the competitive price for 
the inputs show the marginal costs of production. Alternatively, one may consider that these   4
production. The post-entry game is characterized by the Cournot-Nash competition. 
Since, our purpose is not to address the issue of entry-deterrence, we abstract from the 
fixed costs and/or entry costs. Further, we assume that the marginal costs of 
production are such that both firms  always produce positive outputs in the 
equilibrium.  
  We assume that these firms produce a homogeneous product. The inverse 
market demand function is given by  P P q q = + ( ) 1 2  with  ¢ < P 0 and  0 £ ¢ ¢ P , where 
P shows that price of the product and q1, q2 are the outputs produced by firm 1 and 
firm 2 respectively. 
  The move of the game is as follows. At stage 1, firm 1 invests up to a capacity 
level  x. Then, at stage 2, firm 2 enters in the market.
3 After that, at stage 3, firm 1 
decides whether or not to license the technology to firm 2. Production takes place at 
stage 4.  We assume that if firm 1 produces output  1 q  within the limit of the capacity 
it has installed (i.e.,  x q £ 1 ), then his marginal costs of production at the output stage 
is  0. But, if firm 1 wishes to produce  x q > 1  then his marginal cost of production at 





Figure 1 shows the equilibria of the above game. We assume that the market demand is such 
that it ensures unique and stable equilibrium output. Further, for expositional convenience, 
we have drawn the reaction functions as linear. 
Let’s first consider the situation under no-licensing. In Figure 1, the lines AB and CD 
show the reaction functions for firm 1 and firm 2 when these firms produce their products 
                                                                                                                                                        
technologies require same inputs but with different combinations and hence, creates a difference in the 
marginal costs of production.  
3 Since in this analysis we do not consider the possibility of entry-deterrence, we consider that  entry 
occurs always even with different marginal costs of production. 
4 For simplicity, we assume that production requires one input and therefore, in case of c apacity 
commitment prior to production, the marginal cost at the output stage reduces to 0 up to the installed 
capacity level. However, our result will hold even if one considers more than one inputs in the 
production. Then, up to the installed capacity level, marginal cost at the output stage can be positive but 
will be less than its actual marginal cost of production.   5
with marginal costs of production  1 c  and  2 c , respectively. The point S shows the 
equilibrium output levels if firm 1 becomes a Stackelberg leader. It is well known that the 
commitment up to a capacity level prior to the production will shift the reaction function of 
firm 1 to the right and the firm 1 will try to build the capacity up to a level so that in the post-
entry game the equilibrium outputs correspond to the point S. However, it is easy to 
understand that this level of capacity commitment is subgame perfect provided the 
Stackelberg l eader’s output for firm 1 producing with marginal cost  1 c  is less than the 
Cournot-Nash output for firm 1 if firm 1 produces with marginal cost 0 . Otherwise, subgame 
perfect capacity commitment will be equal to firm 1’s Cournot-Nash output with firm 1’s 
marginal cost equal to  0 . To prove our result in a simplest way, we assume that the 
later situation happens, i.e., firm 1’s Stackelberg leader’s output when producing with 
marginal cost  1 c  is more than the firm 1’s Cournot-Nash output when firm 1 produces with 
marginal cost  0 . It is easy to understand that this is the more likely event with relatively 
lower  1 c .
5 Therefore, here firm 1 will install capacity up to his Cournot-Nash output 
level with marginal cost of production  0, i.e., up to B¢ in Figure 1. The line A¢EB¢ 
shows the reaction function for firm 1 when firm 1 installs capacity up to B¢ and 
A¢EB¢ corresponds to firm 1’s marginal cost of production equal to  0. Therefore, in 
the post-entry game the equilibrium will be at E where firm 1 will produce 0B¢ and 
firm 2 will produce B ¢E. This equilibrium shows the outputs when these firms 
produce with their own technologies. Hence, the above discussion provides the 
benchmark for our licensing game. 
Now, suppose that firm 1 installs capacity up to B¢ and decides to license the 
technology. Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), Marjit (1990), Mukherjee (2001) and 
many others, we focus on fixed fee licensing contract. Often it is not possible to 
monitor the rival’s output as is necessary to enforce a royalty provision in a patent 
licensing contract. This may be due to purely informational reasons or because of 
imitation possibility from the licensee after getting the licensed technology. In this 
                                                       
5 Mukherjee (2001) has shown the required condition for this situation under linear inverse market 
demand function. It has been shown that this situation happens if the marginal costs are small enough 
compared to the market size.   6
analysis, we assume that in case of licensing, firm 1 extracts all surplus generated 
from his technology through a licensing fee.
6 
If firm 1 licenses his technology to firm 1 then firm 2’s marginal cost of 
production will be equal to  1 c  and suppose the new reaction function for firm 2 will 
be C¢D¢ in Figure 1. Therefore, if firm 1 licenses his technology then the equilibrium 
in the product market will be at L. So, in case of technology licensing, firm 1 will 
produce 0L¢ and firm 2 will produce LL¢. Hence,  ) ( L B ¢ - ¢ shows the amount of 
unutilized capacity. 
In the above analysis we have assumed that firm 1 installs capacity up to B¢ 
and also licenses his technology. Since after licensing the equilibrium in the product 
market will be at L, another possibility may be to install capacity up to L¢. In that case, 
there will exist no excess capacity and firm 1 can save the wastage amount 
1 ) ( c L B ¢ - ¢ . However, note that in case of capacity installation up to L, the equilibrium 
under no-licensing will be at E¢ and firm 2’s profit under E¢ is greater than that of at E. 
Hence, the reservation payoff (i.e., the profit under no-licensing) of firm 2 will be 
higher when firm 1 installs capacity up to L¢ compared to a situation where firm 1 
installs capacity up to B¢. Therefore, in case of capacity commitment up to L¢, the 
licensee fee will be less compared to a situation where firm 1 installs capacity up to 
B¢. Thus, capacity installation up to B¢ helps to extract more licensee fee, if licensing 
occurs. But, on the other hand, it generates some wastage from excess capacity in case 
of licensing. If the gain from more licensing fee outweighs the loss from wastage, then 
it is better for firm 1 to install up to a capacity level, some portion of which will be 
unutilized after licensing. The next subsection shows that this would be the case when 
the marginal costs are small enough.      
Due to the trade-off between higher licensing fee and wastage from excess 
capacity, it may happen that it is better for firm 1 to install a capacity between L¢ and 
B¢. Less capacity installation than B ¢ reduces license fee and saves wastage from 
excess capacity. However, for any capacity installation more than L¢, there will exist 
an excess capacity if firm 1 decides licensing after capacity installation.  
 
                                                       
6 The qualitative result will hold even under other types of pricing for the technology (e.g., pricing by   7
2.2 Result 
 
In the previous subsection we have described the main point of this paper with a 
diagram. However, there we have assumed that it is better for firm 1 to license his 
technology to firm 2. Further, the benefit from excess capacity through higher 
licensing fee outweighs the cost of excess capacity. In this subsection, we will show 
when these assumptions will be fulfilled.  
Consider the structure as specified in the previous section. Further, for 
simplicity, like the previous subsection we consider that the marginal costs are small 
enough so that without technology licensing, the maximum possible commitment by 
firm 1 is up to his Cournot output level corresponding to the marginal costs of 
production 0and  2 c  for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. 
We solve the game through backward induction. Hence, first we will see when 
licensing is a profitable option given the capacity commitment up to B¢. Then we will 
consider the decision on the amount of capacity installation. 
Conditional on the capacity installation up to B¢, licensing will be profitable if 
it increases industry profit. Further, one should note that when taking the decision on 
licensing, one should consider the profit of firm 1 excluding the cost of capacity 
installation since that investment is sunk when deciding on licensing. Therefore, with 
initial investment up to B ¢, the ex-post Cournot equilibrium without licensing 
corresponds to marginal costs 0 and  c2  for firms 1 and 2 respectively but in case of 
licensing it corresponds to 0 and  c1 for firms 1 and 2 respectively. Therefore, joint 
profits are given by 
 
P q q q q cq ( )( ) 1 2 1 2 2 + + -                  (1) 
 
where c c = 2 without licensing and c c = 1 under licensing. 
 
Lemma 1: If the marginal costs of production  1 c  and  2 c  are small enough then 
licensing is profitable. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nash bargaining).   8
 
Since, the proof is similar to Katz and Shapiro (1985), we are omitting the proof here. 
  Lemma 1 shows the condition for profitable licensing when the firm 1 invests 
up to B¢. Thus, we can say that if the marginal costs are small enough, which is also 
required to generate the equilibrium at E without licensing, the subgame perfect 
capacity installation will be up to B¢ and after that firm 1 will license his technology to 
firm 2. Hence, it will create an excess capacity of  ) ( L B ¢ - ¢ . Though, investment up to 
B¢ helps firm 1 to extract higher price for his technology, in equilibrium, it creates a 
waste of  ( ) ¢ - ¢ B L c1. So, it remains to check whether the firm 1 will be willing to 
investment more than L¢.
7   
  Lemma 1 shows that investment up to B¢ and licensing dominates investment 
up to B¢ and no licensing. This means that, ex-post capacity installation up to B¢, the 
outcome at L is preferable than the outcome at E. It is also well known that the profit 
of an incumbent firm increases from his Cournot-Nash equilibrium up to Stackelberg 
equilibrium. Hence, the outcome at E is preferable than the outcome at E¢. Therefore, 
we can say that, ex-post capacity installation, the outcome at L dominates the outcome 
at E¢. Thus, even if the firm 1 installs capacity up to L¢, he will license his technology 
afterwards. So, the investment up to L¢ will save the investment costs of ( ) ¢ - ¢ B L c1. 
But, the investment up to L¢ instead of B¢ will increase the reservation payoff of firm 2 
to( ( ( )) ) ( )
* * P L q L c q L ¢ + ¢ - ¢ 2 2 2  from ( ( ( )) ) ( )
* * P B q B c q B ¢ + ¢ - ¢ 2 2 2 , where  (.)
*
2 q  is the 
optimal output of firm 2 when firm 1 produces L¢ and B¢ respectively. 
 
Lemma 2: It is preferable for firm 1 to investment more than L¢ when the marginal 
costs are sufficiently small. 
 
Proof: If the firm 1 invests up to L¢ instead of B¢ then the net gain to firm 1 is given 
by 
 
                                                       
7 It is important to note that capacity commitment will be helpful with the possibility of licensing if L¢  
is to the right of K. Otherwise, commitment up to L¢ will not reduce the reservation payoff of the firm 2 
compared to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium G. If the difference in marginal costs are small enough then 
it satisfies that the outcome L will be to the right of G.   9








2 1 B q c B q B P L q c L q L P c L B ¢ - ¢ + ¢ - ¢ - ¢ + ¢ - ¢ - ¢ .   (2) 
 
We can see that, under Cournot conjecture, the marginal gain to firm 1 from 






c P L q L q L
¢
= - - ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ 1 2 2 ( ( )) ( )
* *  
        = - + ¢ + ¢ - c P L q L c 1 2 2 ( ( ( )) )
*     (due to profit maximization by firm 2).   (3) 
 
We can see that the expression (3) is positive when the marginal costs are sufficiently 
small.                           Q.E.D. 
 
Hence, combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can get the following 
proposition immediately. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose the incumbent firm is technologically superior to the entrant. 
If the marginal costs of firm 1 and firm 2 are sufficiently small then the incumbent 
firm will invest in a way so that some portion of this investment will be unutilized in 





Researchers have paid considerable amount of attention to examine the existence of 
excess capacity by the dominant firms. Though theoretical contributions have argued 
that entry deterrence was the motive for holding excess capacity, the empirical 
analysis does not provide much support to this hypothesis. 
  This paper shows that the dominant firms can hold excess capacity not to deter 
entry but for getting higher benefit from other business strategies. In a model with an 
incumbent and entrant we show that an incumbent firm may invest to the capacity in a 
way so that some portion of this investment will be unutilized in equilibrium. 
However, the rationale for this type of investment by the incumbent may be for   10
extracting higher price for the incumbent’s superior technology when licensing this 
technology to the entrant. Further, we show  that this result will hold when the 
marginal costs of production of these firms are sufficiently small. Thus, this analysis 
can suggest the type of industries where it is more likely to find the co-existence of 
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